Rising tension in the Caucasus and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict

2010 was a year of increasing tension in the Caucasus. An increase in bombing activities in Dagestan, Chechnya and Ingushetia, along with armed skirmishes in Nagorno-Karabakh brought questions of stability to Turkey’s doorstep.

It is clear that the region has significant importance as a Turkey main gateway to Russia and the Caspian basin as well as a transit route of energy resources. Therefore, any increase in tension in the region will have significant impact in Turkey. It also has some capacity to generate negative impacts on the political atmosphere and cause problems for ongoing and future projects.

Following the Russia-Georgia war in 2008, attempts to reach a resolution in the Nagorno- Karabakh conflict bilaterally and internationally gained impetus. While Armenia and Azerbaijan met six times in 2009, they came together only three times in 2010. The Minsk Group followed more pro-active policies during this period but even after this traffic, Baku and Yerevan are still far from a resolution.

In fact, since August 2008, we have seen that the peace process becoming more problematic. The unilateral efforts of the parties are causing some uncertainty in the determination of the actors’ roles in the peace process. Russia, while trying to shape arrangements as a co-president of the Minsk Group, is also playing an active role through the policies orchestrated by Kremlin. This paves the way for debates on the insufficiency and weaknesses of the Minsk Group’s policies while strengthening the position of Moscow. In fact, Russia is giving the message that “no solution is possible without my approval!”

Apart from regional and international dynamics, domestic politics has an important role to play. In this context, the Armenian administration is suffering from the rising tension in domestic politics and has limited maneuvering space. On the other hand, Azerbaijan has continued to stick to its policies since 1994 and expects action from Yerevan that is generally isolated from most of the integration policies in the region. In this environment, Azerbaijan and Armenia’s accelerating arms race, coupled with aggressive rhetoric and some clashes in the conflict zone, is not helping draw a positive picture for the future.

Increasing arms race in the region

Armenia has 70,000 soldiers, including militia forces, in Karabakh. Azerbaijan has 90,000 soldiers. Georgia has nearly 40,000 in military forces. In this respect, during the cease-fire period, it is clearly seen that the military forces of both Armenia and Azerbaijan exceed their needs.

Since the cease-fire, Azerbaijan has started to modernize its army. One of the main motivations behind this was the inability of the Azerbaijani army to fight a total war in the Karabakh conflict, which resulted in the occupation of almost 20 percent of its territory. In this respect, Baku has made great achievements in personnel training, armaments and military modernization. In addition, the military budget has increased to $3.12 billion, when it was only $135 million in 2003. On the contrary, Armenia allocated $400 million for military expenses in 2011. That amount would likely increase to up to $600 million when combined with the spending of the Karabakh administration.

Although the military budget of Azerbaijan is higher than Armenia’s military expenditure, including the Karabakh administration’s expenditures, Russia has taken some steps to eliminate that difference. According to Azerbaijani resources, Russia made weapon, equipment and machinery transfers worth $800 million to Armenia in 2009. Russia’s military base in Gyumri plays a crucial role in this respect. Moreover, Armenia enjoys some privileges while purchasing weapons from Russia as a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization. With Azerbaijan’s efforts at obtaining S-300 missiles from Russia a complicated story, Armenia has already deployed S-300 missile systems to strategically critical points.

Azerbaijan tried to make its policies legally and politically legitimate by passing a new military doctrine in June 2010. Actually, the military doctrine waited for quite a long time for the approval after 2007 although this was in parallel with Azerbaijan’s pro-status quo stance. Recently, however, Baku has given some signals that it can start taking a tougher position. In this respect, Azerbaijan, with its new military doctrine, has emphasized the possibility of the war option if a diplomatic solution to the conflict cannot be found.

Armenia responded aggressively to that political change and, in the following days, Armenian officials made some aggressive statements. Armenian officials emphasized their decisiveness in terms of protecting Armenian interests. Moreover, these statements were coupled with a military modernization program for the period 2011-2015.

In 2010, as the language of the politicians became tougher, the atmosphere at the frontline started to get warmer. Azerbaijan has accelerated its intelligence activities in the conflict zone with the help of unmanned aerial vehicles while cease-fire violations have started to increase during the summer. According to the International Crisis Group Report, compared to 2009, cease-fire violations increased nearly 55 percent, and, at least 25 people died during conflicts in 2010.

The clashes in the conflict zone appear to be muscle-flexing. The most best example of this is the Azerbaijani operation in June 2010. The operation, in which Mübariz İbahimov lost his life and became a national hero, was seen as a tactical pre-planned operation by Azerbaijani authorities. It is argued that the Azerbaijanis not only tried to understand the capabilities of the Armenian forces, but also wanted to show the capabilities of the Azerbaijani army. Although there were fewer cease-fire violations toward the end of 2010, clashes restarted in January 2011. These clashes also resulted in loss of life for both sides. Accordingly, this atmosphere has caused some worries for the future of the region.

In this respect, it is critical to continue peace initiatives with decisiveness to avoid a unwanted results. For the future, resolution efforts have the capacity to prevent the potential snowball effect of cease-fire violations. Nevertheless, the Kremlin’s attempts to control the process through the Minsk Group and unilaterally via the Kremlin make the process much more complicated. At the same time, Minsk Group members’ lack of showing political will and having a perspective for the resolution when coupled with being unfamiliar with the dynamics of the region have put the peace process into deadlock. In this sense, the noninvolvement of Turkey in the process can be seen as the missing part of the puzzle. However, the tentative behavior of the United States, France and Russia harden the Turkish position as well.

To sum up, the peace process will certainly take long time. However, the revision and enhancement of the cease-fire measures is urgently needed in the short run for the smooth continuation of the peace process. Looking at the picture, micro-level conflicts have a potential to turn into a snowball that could damage the regional stability on a larger scale.

Hasan Selim Ozertem 

USAK - Center for Energy Security Studies

E-mail: hozertem@gmail.com

This op-ed was firstly published in Hurriyet Daily News on 25 April 2011.