Is Turkey projecting its power in Libya?

Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar left Berlin Conference without committing any promises in January 2020. Probably, then it was more tempting for Haftar to continue military campaign and gain control of the whole country rather than making a ceasefire agreement. However, UN-recognized Government of National Accord (GNA), with Turkey’s support, managed to recontrol Tripoli and push back Haftar forces. This changed the balances dramatically. Now, the officials of Libyan National Army (LNA) call for a ceasefire. 

Diplomatic efforts seek to resolve the ongoing conflict continue. Though, Libyan and Turkish officials’ statements show that the GNA wants to take the control of Sirte and al-Jufra before starting negotiations. In response, Egyptian President Abdelfattah Al-Sisi declared that Sirte and al-Jufra are Cairo’s redline. He visited Egyptian armed forces on the border of Libya to demonstrate Egypt’s position blatantly. Controlling these cities is strategically important for both sides. Sirte is located in the middle of Libyan coastline and a gate that opens to the southern provinces of the country with its modern infrastructure. Moreover, the LNA uses some strategic bases in al-Jufra against the GNA. 

Current developments show that the military conflict is likely to continue in the foreseeable future. Its course will take shape according to the level of engagement of external actors. Until now, the LNA managed to take the support of Egypt, the UAE, France, Saudi Arabia, and Russia, whereas Turkey and Qatar supported the GNA. It is argued that some external actors started to have second thoughts about their partnership with Khalifa Haftar as he recedes back to the east. Among these Jon Alterman from the CSIS mentions the UAE, Russia, France and the US. Conversely, there is an increased diplomatic mobility between Tripoli and Ankara. In this analysis, I will try to scrutinize the parameters behind Turkey’s engagement in Libya.

Turkey’s economic engagement in Libya

Libya was the stepping stone and the main destination for Turkish contractors in the 1970s. Projects in Libya constituted 66 percent of Turkey’s contracting services abroad in this decade. Libya was among the top three destinations for Turkish contractors up until the 2010s. Annual volume of contracts is estimated to reach $4 billion in 2011. Turkish contractors had to leave the country with more than 25.000 Turkish employees when the uprisings turned into an armed conflict. The instability in Libya cost Turkish companies billions of dollars and they look forward to take part in the reconstruction once the stability is restored. 

Turkey’s trade with Libya floated in parallel with the changing stability in the country. Turkey’s foreign trade with Libya gradually increased throughout the 2000s and surpassed $2.3 billion in 2010. After plunging to less than $1 billion in 2011 and 2017 respectively, Turkey’s exports recovered and reached to $1.96 billion in 2019. Additionally, Turkish Petroleum Company (TPAO) started operations in exploration of hydrocarbon reserves as early as 1999, but it suspended its operations due to the unsecure environment. Turkish Minister of Energy and Natural Resources, Fatih Dönmez, stated in May 2020 that the TPAO made official applications to go back and operate in Libya. Once approved, the TPAO will start seismic surveys on Libya’s offshore. Nevertheless, the decision to operate in the offshore should be analyzed in parallel with the political developments in the Eastern Mediterranean. 

Turkey’s political engagement in Libya

Turkey signed two memoranda of understanding with the GNA: "The Security and Military Cooperation" and "Delimitation of the Maritime Jurisdictions" in November 2019. After signing these memoranda, the Sarraj government officially invited Turkey to defend Libya against Haftar forces’ offensive. Upon this request, Turkey sent military advisors and a three-star general with high tech military machinery and equipment, including drones and electronic warfare systems. Soon, these maneuvers changed the balance in favor of the GNA. Haftar forces, which was only 9 km away from Tripoli in January 2020, lost strategic strongholds in the west, including Watiya airbase. In June, the GNA also took the giant Sharara oilfield in Murzuq region back online. 

One of the main reasons behind Turkey’s direct engagement in Libya was the ongoing developments in the Mediterranean. Since 2003, Republic of Cyprus pursue an active policy to delimit maritime zones and signed agreements with Egypt and Israel in 2003 and 2010 respectively. Greece also supports these efforts. Turkey took a passive stance in the early 2000s, but decided to approach Libya as a counter maneuver. Then the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan took a proposal to Moammar Qaddafi. Both leaders decided technical committees to start working on the matter. Yet, these efforts became obsolete when the uprisings started in 2011. After the Shkirat agreement in 2015, Turkey managed to find an UN-recognized addressee, the GNA. Accordingly, Turkey reached an agreement with the GNA in November 2019 in Istanbul. The document that shows the delimitation between Libya and Turkey was later sent to the UN. The limbo was that Turkey signed the memorandum of understanding (MoU) with the Sarraj government, which was under the threat of the LNA’s march to the capital. Consequently, Turkey decided to support the GNA by directly engaging into the conflict with the GNA’s invitation. Nevertheless, some critiques argue that the GNA’s mandate ended in December 2017 and the invitation would encourage Haftar’s backers to further escalate the situation in Libya.

Gönül Tol, a Turkish think tanker based in Washington, further claims that Turkey takes a proactive position in Libya is to gain a leverage in its dialogue with the US. Washington decided to keep out from Libya after the incident that ended up with killing of American career diplomat, Ambassador Christopher Stevens, in 2012. Yet, in the absence of a functioning authority, Libya turned into an arena of power politics. Following Syria, Russia became an active player in Libya to have strong foothold in the Middle East. A private Russian military company, Wagner Group, provided services to the LNA. This support had a critical contribution to the LNA’s success. Moreover, recent reports show that Russia sent aircrafts to Libya, including high tech equipment and weapons. American officials state that a Russian permanent military base with long range missiles would be a game changer for Europe and NATO. Thus, as a NATO member, Turkey’s support for the GNA becomes critical for Euro-Atlantic interests in the region. 

Conclusion

Is Turkey’s engagement in Libya merely a power projection in the region? It is obvious that Turkey flexes its muscles in Libya with its military capacity. Following Syria, Turkey had chance to test its drones and electronic warfare systems just like in Syria. Yet, the findings also show that along with its economic interests in Libya, Turkey is trying to balance maneuvers of some actors in the Eastern Mediterranean by supporting the Sarraj government. The MoU that delimits the maritime zones with the GNA gave Turkey a critical leverage in this respect. Yet, the current dynamics show that the balances in Libya are so fragile and Turkey’s interests are somehow linked to the survival of the government in Tripoli.

Hasan Selim Özertem, Ph.D.

Political Analyst

Ankara

28 June 2020

Note: This piece was previously published on The Arab Eye on July 2, 2020.